When one sleeps on a thing, one sometimes comes to new conclusions. I've been thinking about al this sexual orientation "debate" progressing on a few of these blogs, and I think i've done myself a disservice.
The rational approach and the responsible approach, I think, would be to make an attempt at educating those whose experiences have not succeeded in doing so. I have long been fascinated by Socrates' method of asking question and analogizing the answers to mundane topics, so I'll try to entertain this approach.
First, both posters claim that homosexuality is chosen. A choice is an opportunity for an individual to determine which of two or more outcomes they prefer and subsequently incept that outcome. If given a choice, then,would one choose an outcome which will benefit them or injure them? If one must remove a hot pan from the oven, would one choose the outcome of burning themselves or sparing themselves the burn? One would choose to spare the burn, thus employing a potholder for the sparing. If one must venture out in a blizzard, would one choose the outcome of hypothermia or warmth? One would choose warmth, and thus employ a coat in the warming. If one falls ill and a doctor is available, would one choose the outcome of remaining ill or being healed? One would chose to be made well, and thus employ the doctor in the healing. Thus, if one could choose the outcome of between being accepted by society or being ridiculed by it, would one choose acceptance or ridicule? One would choose acceptance, of course, and thus employ heterosexuality for the purpose of being accepted.
Of course, sometimes people do get burned, suffer hypothermia, or remain ill. Hoever, these occurr when said outcome cannot be avoided; only when one cannot choose the beneficial outcome, as one naturally would, must one suffer the deleterious. If one suffers ridicule, then clearly they suffer it because they could not make the choice to avoid it. Thus, if homosexuality will necessarily meet with ridicule, as Melodi claims the homosexual must reasonably anticipate, then it can be logically assumed that the homosexual does not have the choice to reasonably avoid it.
Both posters, in asserting tht homosexuality is a choice, claim to have knowledge of th nature of homosexuality. If one seeks knowledge of the nature of musicianship, is one best served consulting the musician or the audience? The musician, of course, as the musician experiences the the being of a musician while the audience merely observes him existing. If one seeks knowledge of hte nature of femaleness, does one cnsult the man or the woman? The woman; while the man may observe the femaleness of the woman from without, the woman experiences her femaleness from wthin. the And if one seks kowledge of the nature of the democrat, is one best served consulting the democratic party member or the republican? The democrat, certainly; while both are aware of one another, only the democrat can speak with experiential knowledge on being a democrat.
Thus, if one seeks knowledge of the nature of homosexuality, does one consult the homosexual or the heterosexual? The homosexual experiences homosexuality while the heterosexual only observes it, thus the homosexual is the greater authority.
By "disagreeing" with homosexuality, both posters imply that there is something wrong with it, and I suppose this is a conflict of definition. Some people have claimed that homosexuality is wrong because the purpose of sex is to create children. Let us question this as well, in the style of the old sage, so that we might come to a greater understanding of intention.
It could be said, then, that the purpose of sex organs is to create children, to the exclusion of all others. What is the purpose of feet? One could answer that the purpose of feet is to transport the body. And the purpose of a garden hose? One could answer that the purpose of the garden hose is to provide water for gardening and washing one's car. And the purpose of a book or magazine? To convey ideas in printed form to the reader.
Thus, if applying the sex organs for any use beyond the creation of children, one could logically surmise that the playing of soccer or the recieving of a pedicure is wrong because both apply the feet to a purpose other that transportation. Children running through the spray of a garden hose would be wrong because they apply the garden hose to a purpose other than wtering the garden or washing the car. And seating a child on a telephone book so that sh can see over the dinner table or covering one's head with a magazine in a rainstorm is wrong, because both apply a book or magazine to a purpose other than the communiction of ideas in print form. If we do not criminalize such uses for being outside the stated purpose of the object, we cannot reasonably criminalize homosexuality for ppying the sex organs to a use other than the creation of children.
Another reason that many cite for homosexuality being wrong is that it runs contrary to the law of the christian god. As there are many religions throughout the world and many varieties of adherence, let us consider the question, if one does not adhere to one institution, but to another, is one doing wrong by acting in a way that the non-adherent institution condemns? Consider the institution of sports. Soccer condemns any player but the goalie for touching the ball with the hands, thus would a football player be equally wrong for handling the ball with the hands? Of course not; the rules of football,to which the rules of soccer do not apply, permit the player to handle the ball with their hands, and in fact would do offense to those others playing football. Consider too the institution of traffic law. In Great Britain, it is wrong for a motorist to drive on the right-hand side of the road; thus would the motorist in Casper be equally wrong for driving on the right-hand side? In fact, one who drives ont he left hand side of a Casper road would endanger many lives, regardless of the laws of Great Britain. Finally, consider the institution of laws pertaining to dogs. In Casper, one is required to attach a collar and leash to their dog if one is taking hte dog out in public. Is it wrong, then, to take one's wife out in public without first dressing her in a leash? I have no doubt that the very idea of leashing one's wife is highly offensive to a women's studies class, as it would be to most wives; thus, a the institution that applies its laws to dogs cannot rightly be applied to women.
Thus, if a homosexual does not adhere to an institution which condemns homosexuality, but rather to one which promotes consensual love, is his same-sex relationship wrong by virtue of the non-subscribed ruleset, or right by virtue of the subscribed and inoffensive to those others who so subscribe? The same-sex relationship, pursuant to said institution, would be in the right, and its condemnation would be wrong and offensive to the institution that supports it.
Still another condemnation of homosexuality is the idea that children will grow up to be homosexuals if they witness homosexuality. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the same sex relationship, of itself and defrocked of the implications of social rejection, is unilaterally undesirable for a child's future. Thus the question is: will an adult inevitably imitate all those behaviors which he witnesses as a child? Consider the child raised on a horse ranch. Will the child, necessarily and definitely, grow into an adult that rides horses, or one that is aware and knowledgable that some people ride horses? The adult may or may not ride horses, but he will necessarily and definitely be aware and knowledgable that some people ride horses. Consider too the child who is raised among smokers. Will the child, necessarily and definitely, grow into an adult that smokes, or one that is aware and knowledgable of the fact that some people smoke? He may or may not smoke as an adult, but will necessarily and definitely be aware that some people smoke. Finally, consider the child who is raised in a hospital, possibly for the treatment of a long-term illness. Will the child necessarily and definitely, grow into an adult that practices medecine, or one that is aware and knowledgable of the fact that some people practice medecine? He may or may not practice medecine, but there is no doubt that he will be aware and knowledgable that some people practice medecine.
If a child is raised among homosexuals, will he, necessarily and definitely, grow into an adult that is homosexual, or one that is aware and knowledgable that some people are homosexuals? He may or may not become a homosexual adult, but he will necessarily and definitely become a person who is aware and knowledgable that some people are homosexuals.
Conversely, if a child is raised exclusively around heterosexuals, will the child necessarily and definitely grow into an adult that is heterosexual, or one that is aware and knowledgable that some people are heterosexual? Again, while he may or may not be heterosexual, he will know that some people are. Consider as proof the thousands of homosexuals who never in their childhood encountered a homosexual, but nonetheless end up homosexual. Clearly, it cannot be said that one will necessarily and definitely assume the roles in adulthood that one witnessed in childhood, but instead develop an awareness and knowledge of those lifestyles. Thus, the fear that children who witness homosexuality will become homosexuals is invalid.
In these pages, I have successfully disproven many of the assertions made by those who condemn homosexality, by way of the logical methods of Socrates, long-lauded for his methodology. We have determined that sexuality cannot logically be a choice, that using one's sex organs for the purpose of same-sex enjoyment is no more right or wrong than using them for the purpose of procreation, that one institution's laws regarding homosexuality do not necessarily apply to those that do not subscribe to that institution,and that exposure to homosexualis will not inevitably convert a child to homosexuality. There are counltess other arguments against homosexuality, and I will be happy to similarly disprove any of them.
In some ways I feel apologetic for some of my previous posts. The apology,though, is not rooted so strongly in the possible offense these posts might have incurred against those with whom I do not agree, but more strongly in the offense I have shown myself. Ultimately, as always historically occurrs, the illogical assertions of the oppressing body must, necessarly and definitely, eventually be eradicated by the logical demonstrations of careful intellect. I have done myself wrong by presenting that side of me which viciously abhorrs unjustified hatred in lieu of that side which most effectively can negate that hatred. Rather than scathe those persons who fail to fully consider their opinions before expressing them, as I so gracelessly have, the above is my attempt to eradicate these opinions fom sensible thought by emloying the sensible, as has always served me well in the past. To attack offense with offense can only be as effective as attacking an insane asylum with a banana; thus I will endeavour to refrain from it in the future.
I urge anyone who reads this: approach your opinions in this manner. Think through them. Challenge them rigorously for yourself, so that when you express them, you can do so confidently and intelligently. Do not do yourself the same disservice tha tI did, expressing emotion in the guise of thought to the detriment of all. Whatever your opinion, make sure it is an intelligent one.
Monday, February 25, 2008
Sunday, February 24, 2008
BIGOT SIGN UP!!
Calling all bigots!!
Here it is kids!! here's THE place where all the bigots get to sign their names! come out of the bigot closet folks! find safety in numbers! let your kids figure out how to unravel the mess your limited minds have made!! And monday, meet our founding members, Lindy and Melodi, truly a paragon of misguided morality!!
::for full effect, read aloud with cheesy announcer voice!::
Here it is kids!! here's THE place where all the bigots get to sign their names! come out of the bigot closet folks! find safety in numbers! let your kids figure out how to unravel the mess your limited minds have made!! And monday, meet our founding members, Lindy and Melodi, truly a paragon of misguided morality!!
::for full effect, read aloud with cheesy announcer voice!::
Gloves Off
I've made an attempt to censor my entries, to be a little nicer than some posts warrant, to be a little more nurturing or understandin or generally pleasant. But clearly, this has not paid off,because others don't bother to. I should not come away from this blog assignment furious, and yet I do. You'd think in a women's studies class people might be mindful of their bigotry; apparently women's studies means equal respect for women, but no one else.
Hatred makes me furious. But since its against gay people, you think its okay. Maybe your "god" told you to, but your god is not mine. And incidentally, your "god" is the same one that said women are inferior.
I'm not being nice anymore. And unlike some of you, I'm not going to try to hide behind hte word "opinion". As I wrote in my last post, which I ave no doubt no one read because it was just too many words, what might be an opinion for some is a reality for others. And calling it "opinion" doesn't make it cease being a reality.
In other words, henceforeward, if you dont like my words or opinions, tough shit. And you all have taught me that's okay.
Hatred makes me furious. But since its against gay people, you think its okay. Maybe your "god" told you to, but your god is not mine. And incidentally, your "god" is the same one that said women are inferior.
I'm not being nice anymore. And unlike some of you, I'm not going to try to hide behind hte word "opinion". As I wrote in my last post, which I ave no doubt no one read because it was just too many words, what might be an opinion for some is a reality for others. And calling it "opinion" doesn't make it cease being a reality.
In other words, henceforeward, if you dont like my words or opinions, tough shit. And you all have taught me that's okay.
Wrestling Champ Forfeits to Female
“He’s got morals and values,” the coach of the Kelly Walsh wrestling team, Todd Lattimer, said of Green River wrestler Seth Harris.
In today’s state wrestling championship, defending champion Harris was slated to wrestle NC freshman Jessica Brenton, one of only a few female wrestlers in Wyoming, whose career has been among the most successful of women’s careers in the sport. Harris chose instead to follow what his upbringing tells him about how to treat a “young lady” and forfeited the match. The morals and values Lattimer is referring to are those that led Harris to forfeit his first state wrestling match because it was against a girl, those morals which dictate that women are inferior,and should be treated as such.
The two articles describing Harris’s forfeit in the Casper Star Tribune are rife with praise for the young man, referring to his actions as moral, admiring him for being a man, and observing how well he has learned the difference between right and wrong. Words like “family beliefs, “upbringing,” “courage” and “sacrifice” adorn the report. The smiling face of the forfeiting champion gleams from the pages, a noble visage unharried by the incorruptible chivalry his mormon parents instilled in him. Never mind that Brenton may well have beaten him, girl-parts and all; Harris has won his coaches’ respect.
Brenton’s coach, Scott Russell, praised her wrestling ability. However, he offers no recognition of her courage in participating in what has long been a male-dominated activity. He does not note her nobility in challenging archaic norms, or describe the morals and values which inspired her to pursue her dream of wrestling. He simply says that state laws dictate that girls be allowed to wrestle, and that he follows the rules. The unspoken rule, implied by the reverence for Harris’s decision, seems to be that women actually shouldn’t be allowed to wrestle; Harris is being praised for noting such.
Words like morals, family values, right and wrong, are charged with something far more than their meaning. When such words are called upon, it frequently seems that they are calling down the writ of God, denoting who is playing by the rules of God and who is not. Rarely is it noted that morals refer not to a set of defined rules and their interpretations, but only to the existence of that set, their meanings varying from person to person. I strongly doubt that any person on earth lacks some moral code of their own, some system of conduct which they believe is appropriate for human behavior. While for some, morals entail not injuring women, others might call morals striving for success, and still others may observe morals as sacrificing virgins to the god of thunder. Further, a moral code describes a spectrum of offenses. While it may be immoral to give up, it would be more immoral to wrestle a girl. Morals do not denote what is humane, in the classical sense; rather, they describe specific and variable codes for living. The coach’s frequent generalizing references to morals, values, and the like seem to assume that all people share that same code, when clearly they do not.
In current society, particularly in politics, morals have become a buzzword, a buzzword which seems to make the same oversight as wrestling coaches. When President Bush refers to “good family values,” I find myself asking, “which family?” Harris demonstrated values of a traditional Christian sort, values that were formed in an era when the superiority of white males was unquestioned. These morals defined the treatment of women based on the theory that they are intrinsically inferior. Thus, one does not hit a woman because she is naturally unable to defend herself. In keeping with this moral code, however, it would be immoral to allow a woman to own property because she is ill-equipped to effectivey manage it.
In the public eye, when someone refers to morals, these are the morals that are brought to mind. Being moral, then, cannot be cited as a universally good trait; rather, it simply describes a set of behaviors that one can expect an individual to exhibit, based on those beliefs they hold most dear. Thus, one can be both moral and wrong, when wrong is defined as the value of actions which do harm to an individual or to society. In the case of Harris, whose forfeiture is derived from his morals- his personal rules- regarding the treatment of women, those who share something akin to my own moral code would see his behavior as moral and wrong, in that he is following his moral code, but in doing so damages an individual and/or society.
Brenton has established herself as a skillful wrestler, yet Harris forfeits to her because she is female, irrespective of her skill. In doing so, he implies that she is not skillful enough to offer a defense, and that her participating in wrestling is morally wrong, regardless of its amoral value. He offends her morality, which dictates that she should wrestle. Moreover, his actions injure society; by acting upon morals that assume inequality to be natural, they cultivate an attitude of inequality that has become archaic and injurious to those who were once oppressed by it.
In short, the liberality with which people refer to morals and values cultivates oppression,and these terms should be called upon only with greater forethought regarding their meanings. We cannot in good conscience assume that because one is moral, that their morals are correct and good. Such an implication suggests the degree to which oppression has been institutionalized, that we could praise someone’s moral behavior when it is a direct affront to the ideals of equality. An action may be moral and still be unjust, if justice is that which gives each his or her due. With that said, in both wrestling and justice, Brenton has triumphed over Harris, regardless of morals or nobility or antiquated ideals of manliness.
In today’s state wrestling championship, defending champion Harris was slated to wrestle NC freshman Jessica Brenton, one of only a few female wrestlers in Wyoming, whose career has been among the most successful of women’s careers in the sport. Harris chose instead to follow what his upbringing tells him about how to treat a “young lady” and forfeited the match. The morals and values Lattimer is referring to are those that led Harris to forfeit his first state wrestling match because it was against a girl, those morals which dictate that women are inferior,and should be treated as such.
The two articles describing Harris’s forfeit in the Casper Star Tribune are rife with praise for the young man, referring to his actions as moral, admiring him for being a man, and observing how well he has learned the difference between right and wrong. Words like “family beliefs, “upbringing,” “courage” and “sacrifice” adorn the report. The smiling face of the forfeiting champion gleams from the pages, a noble visage unharried by the incorruptible chivalry his mormon parents instilled in him. Never mind that Brenton may well have beaten him, girl-parts and all; Harris has won his coaches’ respect.
Brenton’s coach, Scott Russell, praised her wrestling ability. However, he offers no recognition of her courage in participating in what has long been a male-dominated activity. He does not note her nobility in challenging archaic norms, or describe the morals and values which inspired her to pursue her dream of wrestling. He simply says that state laws dictate that girls be allowed to wrestle, and that he follows the rules. The unspoken rule, implied by the reverence for Harris’s decision, seems to be that women actually shouldn’t be allowed to wrestle; Harris is being praised for noting such.
Words like morals, family values, right and wrong, are charged with something far more than their meaning. When such words are called upon, it frequently seems that they are calling down the writ of God, denoting who is playing by the rules of God and who is not. Rarely is it noted that morals refer not to a set of defined rules and their interpretations, but only to the existence of that set, their meanings varying from person to person. I strongly doubt that any person on earth lacks some moral code of their own, some system of conduct which they believe is appropriate for human behavior. While for some, morals entail not injuring women, others might call morals striving for success, and still others may observe morals as sacrificing virgins to the god of thunder. Further, a moral code describes a spectrum of offenses. While it may be immoral to give up, it would be more immoral to wrestle a girl. Morals do not denote what is humane, in the classical sense; rather, they describe specific and variable codes for living. The coach’s frequent generalizing references to morals, values, and the like seem to assume that all people share that same code, when clearly they do not.
In current society, particularly in politics, morals have become a buzzword, a buzzword which seems to make the same oversight as wrestling coaches. When President Bush refers to “good family values,” I find myself asking, “which family?” Harris demonstrated values of a traditional Christian sort, values that were formed in an era when the superiority of white males was unquestioned. These morals defined the treatment of women based on the theory that they are intrinsically inferior. Thus, one does not hit a woman because she is naturally unable to defend herself. In keeping with this moral code, however, it would be immoral to allow a woman to own property because she is ill-equipped to effectivey manage it.
In the public eye, when someone refers to morals, these are the morals that are brought to mind. Being moral, then, cannot be cited as a universally good trait; rather, it simply describes a set of behaviors that one can expect an individual to exhibit, based on those beliefs they hold most dear. Thus, one can be both moral and wrong, when wrong is defined as the value of actions which do harm to an individual or to society. In the case of Harris, whose forfeiture is derived from his morals- his personal rules- regarding the treatment of women, those who share something akin to my own moral code would see his behavior as moral and wrong, in that he is following his moral code, but in doing so damages an individual and/or society.
Brenton has established herself as a skillful wrestler, yet Harris forfeits to her because she is female, irrespective of her skill. In doing so, he implies that she is not skillful enough to offer a defense, and that her participating in wrestling is morally wrong, regardless of its amoral value. He offends her morality, which dictates that she should wrestle. Moreover, his actions injure society; by acting upon morals that assume inequality to be natural, they cultivate an attitude of inequality that has become archaic and injurious to those who were once oppressed by it.
In short, the liberality with which people refer to morals and values cultivates oppression,and these terms should be called upon only with greater forethought regarding their meanings. We cannot in good conscience assume that because one is moral, that their morals are correct and good. Such an implication suggests the degree to which oppression has been institutionalized, that we could praise someone’s moral behavior when it is a direct affront to the ideals of equality. An action may be moral and still be unjust, if justice is that which gives each his or her due. With that said, in both wrestling and justice, Brenton has triumphed over Harris, regardless of morals or nobility or antiquated ideals of manliness.
Saturday, February 16, 2008
The universal theorey
Consider all the isms: ageism, sexism, racism, and the like. In class, we talked about several theories on how to examine al of these. We talked about one theory which essentially stacks these attributes to determine an individual's level of oppression: woman + black + lesbian = oppression X three. We talked about a theorey that considers each inidivudual, how all their potentially oppressive attributes feed into one another to cohesively describe their experience of oppression. But is there a universal theory of everything, a holy grail among social scientists as it is among physicists? Is it possible to remove the idea from the trait, to study oppression without considering specifically what oppresses? Can we, as Socrates sought to, find the "essence", that universal by which all oppression might be measured, qualified and understood?
I think in order to find the broad essence, we must look to the narrow. It seems a commonality among all theories that it behooves the examiner to group the experience of oppression by the trait which summons it. Whether we consider how sexuality, color and sex stack together, or whether we consider how there three traits work on the individual level,we are still examining experience based on trait. I think these traits are too broad. Rather than consider an individual based on what groups they might be appropriate fo (lesbians, women, blacks, etc), why not think of them as one group on their own? We consider this individual as a member of these three minority groups, but instead think of her as a member of only one minority group- that of the black female homosexual Suddenly, we are presented with innumerable minority groups, where once there were only a few. We could look equally at the male hispanic high-income minority group, or the ftm transgendered asian babyboomer minority group. We combine them like ingredients on a salad bar,and no two are alike. Like a salad, we cannot realistically assemble them and devour them piece by piece; rather, we must taste all the ingredients together as one unique flavor.
Now that we have broken our groups down to the smallest possible classifications, let us broaden the considerations again. With so many variables and so many experiences, what broad commonalities might we expect to find? We will find very few specific commonalities between the wealthy hispanic male and the 60+ asian ftm transgender, but obviously we still consider them both oppressed. We might hear word like "don't fit in" or " try harder" or "stares," simple concepts applied to what has always been a complex theoretical framework. When we ask onlookers to record their feelings about these people, commonalities might include "wierd," "wrong" or "uncomfortable", combined of course with many colorful ideas that otherwise don't match one another. We will find so many differences in response, from both subject and onlooker, but very few commonalities.
It is in these commonalities that I think we would find our universal theory. These simple terms suggest a commonality of experience that can draw an essential of oppression, an essential that is the only relevent consideration in the search for a cure. For so many decades we have eplored oppression in all its specifics, considered how minutae have defined the experiences of individuals, and all this time I think we may have been travelling the harder and less rewarding path. All of society, both oppressed and oppressor, has occupied itself with figuring out the differences, and frankly the reward has been perpetuating them. Spiecifcs have generated this oppressiont hat we seek to understand, and it is only in generalizations that we will succeed in dissolving it.
Sometimes, in cherished rarities, I stumble upon something in my writing which I find truly intriguing. This, I think, is one of them. I have no doubt that no one in our class will even trouble themselves to read this lengthy tome; indeed only one person thus far has read any of my posts, and even that was at my urging. Nonetheless, I am glad to be writing them. In this case, particularly, what began as a weekendmusing, partly to fulfill a class requirement, has turned into something that I would love to write a masters thesis on one day. If nothing else comes of this, I hope that, at least, does.
josh
I think in order to find the broad essence, we must look to the narrow. It seems a commonality among all theories that it behooves the examiner to group the experience of oppression by the trait which summons it. Whether we consider how sexuality, color and sex stack together, or whether we consider how there three traits work on the individual level,we are still examining experience based on trait. I think these traits are too broad. Rather than consider an individual based on what groups they might be appropriate fo (lesbians, women, blacks, etc), why not think of them as one group on their own? We consider this individual as a member of these three minority groups, but instead think of her as a member of only one minority group- that of the black female homosexual Suddenly, we are presented with innumerable minority groups, where once there were only a few. We could look equally at the male hispanic high-income minority group, or the ftm transgendered asian babyboomer minority group. We combine them like ingredients on a salad bar,and no two are alike. Like a salad, we cannot realistically assemble them and devour them piece by piece; rather, we must taste all the ingredients together as one unique flavor.
Now that we have broken our groups down to the smallest possible classifications, let us broaden the considerations again. With so many variables and so many experiences, what broad commonalities might we expect to find? We will find very few specific commonalities between the wealthy hispanic male and the 60+ asian ftm transgender, but obviously we still consider them both oppressed. We might hear word like "don't fit in" or " try harder" or "stares," simple concepts applied to what has always been a complex theoretical framework. When we ask onlookers to record their feelings about these people, commonalities might include "wierd," "wrong" or "uncomfortable", combined of course with many colorful ideas that otherwise don't match one another. We will find so many differences in response, from both subject and onlooker, but very few commonalities.
It is in these commonalities that I think we would find our universal theory. These simple terms suggest a commonality of experience that can draw an essential of oppression, an essential that is the only relevent consideration in the search for a cure. For so many decades we have eplored oppression in all its specifics, considered how minutae have defined the experiences of individuals, and all this time I think we may have been travelling the harder and less rewarding path. All of society, both oppressed and oppressor, has occupied itself with figuring out the differences, and frankly the reward has been perpetuating them. Spiecifcs have generated this oppressiont hat we seek to understand, and it is only in generalizations that we will succeed in dissolving it.
Sometimes, in cherished rarities, I stumble upon something in my writing which I find truly intriguing. This, I think, is one of them. I have no doubt that no one in our class will even trouble themselves to read this lengthy tome; indeed only one person thus far has read any of my posts, and even that was at my urging. Nonetheless, I am glad to be writing them. In this case, particularly, what began as a weekendmusing, partly to fulfill a class requirement, has turned into something that I would love to write a masters thesis on one day. If nothing else comes of this, I hope that, at least, does.
josh
Aother aspect of the system
Last week, we discussed how oppression is a system and examined the necessity of examining other mechanisms of the system. I thought it appropriate, then, to examine how stereotypes can afect even the seemingly most mainstream of us. My classmates, I imagine, would question how I might be affected by stereotypes; by all accounts I am a white male of god breeding and respectable finances, certainly placed squarely in the realm of emanent acceptability. I imagine some of them would find me arrogant, obnoxious, even typical. Even as such,though, find myself subject to stereotyping.
I am a classically trained chef, currently employed at Paradise Valley Country Club as the executive chef, the highest authority in the restaurant. I am an expert in food, beverage and hospitality. I design five-star menus, prepare excellent cuisine, maintain a rigorously balanced budget, eticulously control my inventory. Futher, I train both kitchen- and service- staff to excel in their positions. I teach my recipes to my kitchen staff, I teach service to my dining room staff. For the level of excellence I demand, this is not an easy task, and I am well compensated for my efforts. Indeed, between my job and other investments, I make more money than many of the people I serve, and more tan some of the people that pay me. I am alsways on call, I work at the restaurant and at home,and it is rare that I get a day off.
My Sous Chef (french under-chief, essentially my assistant) is a 55 year old gentleman named Mike. He has been involved in golf management for longer than I've been alive. After trying out several other professions, he fel into cooking, a pursuit he has long enjoyed at home though rarely explored professionally. Relative to our levels of skill and training, I am appropriate for my position, and he is appropriate for his. We work well together. He works five days a week.
Here comes the stereotype. The other day our dishwasher went down, so I called in a repairman. The repairman arrived and proceeded to ask Mike about the problem. He checked out the dishwasher, and told Mike what was wrong with it. He told Mike what the solution was and asked for his approval for fixing it. The only ting the man ever said to me was asking where the bathroom was. In the end,though, I was the one to sign the work order.
This sort of thing happens all the time. Guests tell Mike what an excellent menu he designed, how impressed they are at how well he runs the kitchen. When they talk to me, it is usually to tell me either how great mike is doing, or to tell me how well I compliment his efforts. Unless I point i out, it never occurrs to ANYONE that the 29 year old might be the 55 year old's boss. Because of my age, everyone assumes that I'm just a cook.
I used to get incensed by this. It used to piss me off that he got al the praise, when all he did was follow my instructions. I've since come around. While he was stuck dealing with the brutish repairman, I was free to get my work done and didn't have to deal with it. Whiel he's stuck listening to our boorish guests' unrefined opinions, I can avoid it without notice. And when someone is dissatisfied, he gets to hear about it. Where it counts,though, in the boss's eyes, in the pocketbook, I get all the praise I need.
Stereotype? Yes, but I'll use it to my advantage.
I am a classically trained chef, currently employed at Paradise Valley Country Club as the executive chef, the highest authority in the restaurant. I am an expert in food, beverage and hospitality. I design five-star menus, prepare excellent cuisine, maintain a rigorously balanced budget, eticulously control my inventory. Futher, I train both kitchen- and service- staff to excel in their positions. I teach my recipes to my kitchen staff, I teach service to my dining room staff. For the level of excellence I demand, this is not an easy task, and I am well compensated for my efforts. Indeed, between my job and other investments, I make more money than many of the people I serve, and more tan some of the people that pay me. I am alsways on call, I work at the restaurant and at home,and it is rare that I get a day off.
My Sous Chef (french under-chief, essentially my assistant) is a 55 year old gentleman named Mike. He has been involved in golf management for longer than I've been alive. After trying out several other professions, he fel into cooking, a pursuit he has long enjoyed at home though rarely explored professionally. Relative to our levels of skill and training, I am appropriate for my position, and he is appropriate for his. We work well together. He works five days a week.
Here comes the stereotype. The other day our dishwasher went down, so I called in a repairman. The repairman arrived and proceeded to ask Mike about the problem. He checked out the dishwasher, and told Mike what was wrong with it. He told Mike what the solution was and asked for his approval for fixing it. The only ting the man ever said to me was asking where the bathroom was. In the end,though, I was the one to sign the work order.
This sort of thing happens all the time. Guests tell Mike what an excellent menu he designed, how impressed they are at how well he runs the kitchen. When they talk to me, it is usually to tell me either how great mike is doing, or to tell me how well I compliment his efforts. Unless I point i out, it never occurrs to ANYONE that the 29 year old might be the 55 year old's boss. Because of my age, everyone assumes that I'm just a cook.
I used to get incensed by this. It used to piss me off that he got al the praise, when all he did was follow my instructions. I've since come around. While he was stuck dealing with the brutish repairman, I was free to get my work done and didn't have to deal with it. Whiel he's stuck listening to our boorish guests' unrefined opinions, I can avoid it without notice. And when someone is dissatisfied, he gets to hear about it. Where it counts,though, in the boss's eyes, in the pocketbook, I get all the praise I need.
Stereotype? Yes, but I'll use it to my advantage.
Saturday, February 2, 2008
Redefining the lady.
This afternoon, my housemate Jessica was ruminating to me about her blog entry for women's studies. "Where do I fit?" she asked, " I like men, I'm not motherly, and I'm certainly not a lady!" her blog can be found at jswatters.blogspot.com, a well crafted piece that I hope several of you will respond to.
SHe got me to thinking, though, about this set of parameters that may be referred to as "ladylike" (or gentlemanly,respectively). Ladylike, I think, referred at one time not to behaving as a lady, but behaving as the lady. The term was coined ages ago, in reference to the comportment of the lord's wife, the matriarchal head of a noble house,charged with maintaining the house staff and producing an heir. Her demeanor represented the pride of her house, and her stature reflected that of her family. We hear ladylike, though, and we think of etiquitte lessons involving the balancing of books on one's head, of trailing a pinky into the air as we sip our tea, or wearing a hat, notable for its wanton garishness, to church on Sunday. We think posture, poise, gentility, chantilly lace adorning a waifish young belle riding sidesaddle across a field of honeysuckle. With regard to current academia, we think deferrment to male superiority, speaking in reponse though not initiation, knowing one's place to be decidedly a rung or two below. But, in modern terms, what is it to be like the Lady, and is it really bad?
We have, over many decades, worked to correct the glaring inequalities intrinsic to the archaic idea of ladyhood, and the new millennium finds us dispensing even with those "polite" inequalities espoused by the 19th century's cult of true womanhood. No longer are women in the U.S. barred from voting or owning property; rather, they are active participants in the political and economic machine. When once women were considered the property of their husband and subject to even his most martial laws, they now find themselves in a position of self-determination, justified by current academia, supported by numerous schools of liberal thought, and protected by laws that assert their individuality. For previous generations, a woman's list of career goals was, of necessity, shorter and of lesser regard (and frequency) than her grocery list; today's woman has greater access to the career of her choice than ever before, and gender-stratified earning potential is creeping, albeit slowly, toward equalibrium. And yet, ladylike remains a positive adjective in our cultural lexicon, despite its historical and archaic implications.
History, academic discourse, science, law and economy have all demonstrated, condemned, and systematically reduced the oppressive components of being ladylike. Nonetheless, young women are still taught that being ladylike is a positive and enriching pursuit. One must assume, therefore, that the term, divested of its social constraints, encompasses a number of attributes beneficial to the modern woman, enough so that the archetype is proliferated. Essentially, the word and its concurrent image lives on, redefined to meet the needs of women in a more egalitarian culture.
One might discount women's etiquitte as nothing more than affectation, a set of arbitrarily assigned behavioral norms serving no actual purpose beyond supporting the image of the frail, demurr and wholly incompetent 19th century coquette. Personal appearance, too, could be viewed as such; a woman who is meticulously dressed, who dons makeup appropriately, who sits with a certain posture and walks with a certain stride might well be adhering to the traditional rules of lady-ism. This does not mean, however, that attributes like conscientious appearance, courteous articulation, and deliberate stature are equally as damning as the mechanisms of oppression that once mandated them. Employing polite language could certainly be construed as a demonstration of deferrment, but could equally be interprited as an assertion of respect for one's audience, a description of how one wishes to be addressed in return, or an attempt to portray oneself as professional. Conscientious dress and makeup, while certainly posing a possibility of intended seduction, can also indicate a positive self image or attention to detail. The way a person sits, stands or walks can just as easily demonstrate a drive toward perfection or a air of intention and competence as it can indicate accession to institutional folkways. One cannot categorically condemn all aspects of a phenomenon based on its associated historical accompaniments; one must consider other possibilities.
Consider the example of the job interview, in which we learned that women who do not wear makeup to a job interview are offered between 13% and 17% less than their made-up counterparts. The implication here is that women who present as feminine, as sexy, are rewarded for their willing conformity to make appetites with greater pay. There is, however, another possibility worthy of consideration, one which may not draw these findings as oppressively as the above interpretation but still succeed in explaining them.
Women and men dress differently. A woman might wear a skirt suit to an interview, while a man might wear a shirt and tie. A woman may put make-up on and paint her nails, while a man might trim his facial hair. A woman might carry a purse, and a man a wallet. These are the expected norms of professional dress in current culture, and applicants are rightly expected to adhere to them. Thus, an applicant is able to describe in their personal grooming competence the level of competence they will display with regard to their job duties. If a woman lacks the attention to detail necessary to make up her face, or a man to trim his beard, one can usually assume they lack the attention to detail necessary to be trusted with rigorous job duties. Sex and oppression aside, differences in expected dress aside, few people would value a slob as highly as a well-kept individual.
In the Navy, we spent 10 weeks making and remaking our beds, folding and refolding our laundry, packing and repacking our bags. We were not taught these skills to equip us for some vitally-important bedmaking conflict; rather, by keeping one's rack and locker in perfect condition, a recruit could demonstrate his precision in handling those instruments of war that his career may someday lead him to. Personal civilian appearance is no different.
A person who is proud of themselves takes care of themselves, regardless of what specifics that care may entail. They make their outside reflect their inside; they take pride in their appearance, not to gain favor from men, but to describe their capability and demand esteem. They meet social norms, even exceed them, to show that they are capable of it.
To redefine ladylike, I think, one must consider appearance as an epression of self within the rules of a given situation. To be ladylike, today, a woman must not only present herself as perfectly capable, but be perfectly capable as well. For people to show her esteem, she must present herself as worthy of it. These rules apply no less to men; To be gentlemanly or ladylike, one must be skilled in appearance as in fact. As the lady of the house once did, the modern lady or gentleman must handle anything they face, be it oppression or interview, and look good doing it.
Incidentally, when I hire people, I am far more likely to hire a made-up woman than an unshaven man.
Others of us, I have noted, have cited such attributes as crossing one's legs or refraining from public belching as among those expected of a lady. Historically, however, there were constraints far more significant placed on women who wished to carry the title. They were barred from most employment beyond domestic or child-related work,
SHe got me to thinking, though, about this set of parameters that may be referred to as "ladylike" (or gentlemanly,respectively). Ladylike, I think, referred at one time not to behaving as a lady, but behaving as the lady. The term was coined ages ago, in reference to the comportment of the lord's wife, the matriarchal head of a noble house,charged with maintaining the house staff and producing an heir. Her demeanor represented the pride of her house, and her stature reflected that of her family. We hear ladylike, though, and we think of etiquitte lessons involving the balancing of books on one's head, of trailing a pinky into the air as we sip our tea, or wearing a hat, notable for its wanton garishness, to church on Sunday. We think posture, poise, gentility, chantilly lace adorning a waifish young belle riding sidesaddle across a field of honeysuckle. With regard to current academia, we think deferrment to male superiority, speaking in reponse though not initiation, knowing one's place to be decidedly a rung or two below. But, in modern terms, what is it to be like the Lady, and is it really bad?
We have, over many decades, worked to correct the glaring inequalities intrinsic to the archaic idea of ladyhood, and the new millennium finds us dispensing even with those "polite" inequalities espoused by the 19th century's cult of true womanhood. No longer are women in the U.S. barred from voting or owning property; rather, they are active participants in the political and economic machine. When once women were considered the property of their husband and subject to even his most martial laws, they now find themselves in a position of self-determination, justified by current academia, supported by numerous schools of liberal thought, and protected by laws that assert their individuality. For previous generations, a woman's list of career goals was, of necessity, shorter and of lesser regard (and frequency) than her grocery list; today's woman has greater access to the career of her choice than ever before, and gender-stratified earning potential is creeping, albeit slowly, toward equalibrium. And yet, ladylike remains a positive adjective in our cultural lexicon, despite its historical and archaic implications.
History, academic discourse, science, law and economy have all demonstrated, condemned, and systematically reduced the oppressive components of being ladylike. Nonetheless, young women are still taught that being ladylike is a positive and enriching pursuit. One must assume, therefore, that the term, divested of its social constraints, encompasses a number of attributes beneficial to the modern woman, enough so that the archetype is proliferated. Essentially, the word and its concurrent image lives on, redefined to meet the needs of women in a more egalitarian culture.
One might discount women's etiquitte as nothing more than affectation, a set of arbitrarily assigned behavioral norms serving no actual purpose beyond supporting the image of the frail, demurr and wholly incompetent 19th century coquette. Personal appearance, too, could be viewed as such; a woman who is meticulously dressed, who dons makeup appropriately, who sits with a certain posture and walks with a certain stride might well be adhering to the traditional rules of lady-ism. This does not mean, however, that attributes like conscientious appearance, courteous articulation, and deliberate stature are equally as damning as the mechanisms of oppression that once mandated them. Employing polite language could certainly be construed as a demonstration of deferrment, but could equally be interprited as an assertion of respect for one's audience, a description of how one wishes to be addressed in return, or an attempt to portray oneself as professional. Conscientious dress and makeup, while certainly posing a possibility of intended seduction, can also indicate a positive self image or attention to detail. The way a person sits, stands or walks can just as easily demonstrate a drive toward perfection or a air of intention and competence as it can indicate accession to institutional folkways. One cannot categorically condemn all aspects of a phenomenon based on its associated historical accompaniments; one must consider other possibilities.
Consider the example of the job interview, in which we learned that women who do not wear makeup to a job interview are offered between 13% and 17% less than their made-up counterparts. The implication here is that women who present as feminine, as sexy, are rewarded for their willing conformity to make appetites with greater pay. There is, however, another possibility worthy of consideration, one which may not draw these findings as oppressively as the above interpretation but still succeed in explaining them.
Women and men dress differently. A woman might wear a skirt suit to an interview, while a man might wear a shirt and tie. A woman may put make-up on and paint her nails, while a man might trim his facial hair. A woman might carry a purse, and a man a wallet. These are the expected norms of professional dress in current culture, and applicants are rightly expected to adhere to them. Thus, an applicant is able to describe in their personal grooming competence the level of competence they will display with regard to their job duties. If a woman lacks the attention to detail necessary to make up her face, or a man to trim his beard, one can usually assume they lack the attention to detail necessary to be trusted with rigorous job duties. Sex and oppression aside, differences in expected dress aside, few people would value a slob as highly as a well-kept individual.
In the Navy, we spent 10 weeks making and remaking our beds, folding and refolding our laundry, packing and repacking our bags. We were not taught these skills to equip us for some vitally-important bedmaking conflict; rather, by keeping one's rack and locker in perfect condition, a recruit could demonstrate his precision in handling those instruments of war that his career may someday lead him to. Personal civilian appearance is no different.
A person who is proud of themselves takes care of themselves, regardless of what specifics that care may entail. They make their outside reflect their inside; they take pride in their appearance, not to gain favor from men, but to describe their capability and demand esteem. They meet social norms, even exceed them, to show that they are capable of it.
To redefine ladylike, I think, one must consider appearance as an epression of self within the rules of a given situation. To be ladylike, today, a woman must not only present herself as perfectly capable, but be perfectly capable as well. For people to show her esteem, she must present herself as worthy of it. These rules apply no less to men; To be gentlemanly or ladylike, one must be skilled in appearance as in fact. As the lady of the house once did, the modern lady or gentleman must handle anything they face, be it oppression or interview, and look good doing it.
Incidentally, when I hire people, I am far more likely to hire a made-up woman than an unshaven man.
Others of us, I have noted, have cited such attributes as crossing one's legs or refraining from public belching as among those expected of a lady. Historically, however, there were constraints far more significant placed on women who wished to carry the title. They were barred from most employment beyond domestic or child-related work,
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